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1. Introduction
The distinction between “thick” and “thin” evaluative and normative concepts, 
and its  importance to ethical  theory,  has been an active topic in  recent  meta-
ethics.  That  debate has a  reputation for  obscurity  which isn’t,  I  think,  wholly 
unearned.  But  that  needn’t  be  an  obstacle  in  determining  whether  a  similar 
distinction can be drawn between thick and thin epistemic concepts and what kind 
of importance such a distinction might have to epistemology.
This  paper  concerns  meta-epistemology.  It  defends  three  claims 
concerning thick and thin epistemic concepts. There is no straightforward way to 
establish a good, clear distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts on 
the basis of an analogy with thick and thin concepts in ethics (§2).  Assuming 
there is such a distinction, its importance to epistemology cannot be established 
on  semantic  grounds;  there  is  no  semantic  case  for  treating  thick  epistemic 
concepts as prior to the thin or otherwise taking a turn to a thicker epistemology 
(§3). Considerations regarding the structure of substantive epistemological theory 
also  don't  establish  that  thick  epistemic  concepts  enjoy  systematic  theoretical 
priority over the thin (§4). A good case has yet to be made for a radical theoretical 
turn to thicker epistemology.
2. The thick and the thin in ethics and epistemology
Discussions  of thick  and  thin  concepts  in  ethics  almost  invariably begin  with 
examples.  Typical examples of thick evaluative or normative concepts include 
CRUELTY, BRUTALITY, EXPLOITATION, DECEITFULNESS, GENEROSITY, and GRATITUDE.1 Typical 
1. I’ll use small capitals to designate concepts. Words and other linguistic expressions will 
appear in single quotes when they are mentioned. Properties are designated by italics. Italics 
are used also for highlighting.  
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examples of thin concepts are those expressed by many occurrences of words like 
‘good,’ ‘wrong,’ and ‘ought.’2 
But, moving beyond examples, it is hard to find an adequate account of 
what makes an  evaluative concept count as thick and distinguishes these from 
concepts that are thin in a relevant contrasting sense. In an influential discussion, 
Bernard Williams says that thick concepts express a “union of fact and value” in 
that their applicability is both “action-guiding” (it at least typically indicates the 
presence of reasons for action) and “world-guided” (it depends on how the world 
is in certain non-evaluative respects).3 It has become common to say that a term 
stands  for  a  thick  value  concept  if  it  expresses  an  evaluative  concept  with 
significant non-evaluative content, and that thick value concepts differ from the 
thin at  least  in the way they seem to combine description and evaluation as a 
matter of their meaning. It might be thought, for instance, that even if causing 
gratuitous pain is both cruel and wrong, its wrongness isn’t encoded in the very 
meaning of ‘wrong’ in the way its cruelty is encoded in that of ‘cruel.’  
The existence of some sort of distinction between thick and thin concepts 
in  ethics isn’t  in  doubt.  At  least  the typical  examples of thick and thin value 
concepts seem clearly to differ, along some dimension of specificity, with respect 
to  how descriptive they are. So far as their meanings go, ‘cruel’ and ‘deceitful’ 
seem to have richer non-evaluative meaning, and their applicability more robustly 
world-guided,  than  ‘wrong’ or  ‘bad.’  This  much  fits  the  observation  that  the 
standard way to draw the distinction between thick and thin value concepts marks 
a  difference  in  degree  (of  non-evaluative information  encoded in  the concept) 
rather than in kind (cf. Scheffler 1987: 417-18). But what remains unclear is how 
to draw a theoretically significant but more or less neutral distinction between 
thick and thin evaluative concepts.4
2. Since it’ll make no difference to my discussion whether there is some significant distinction 
between the evaluative and normative, I’ll use ‘evaluative’ to cover both.
3. See Williams (1985: 128, 140). For some other ways of developing the general idea behind 
Williams's distinction, see e.g. Gibbard (1992), Blackburn (1992), and Dancy (1995).
4. Eklund (MS) argues that several existing accounts of the thick-thin distinction are defective 
on this score. 
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It is equally unclear how to distinguish between thick and thin epistemic 
concepts on the basis of an analogy with thick and thin concepts in ethics. The 
idea that thick value concepts have significant  non-evaluative content whereas 
thin  value  concepts  have  no,  or  not  much,  significant  non-evaluative  content 
could be applied to epistemic concepts in two different ways. 
One  option  is  to  take  a  direct analogy  with  the  case  of  ethics  and 
distinguish  between  thick  and  thin  epistemic  concepts  in  terms  of  the  same 
distinction  between  evaluative and  non-evaluative content.  On  this  view both 
thick  and  thin  epistemic  concepts  are  evaluative  concepts,  distinguished  by 
whether or not they have significant non-evaluative content. 
The other option is to take a structural analogy with the case of ethics and 
distinguish between thick and thin epistemic concepts in terms of the distinction 
between  epistemic and  non-epistemic content.  On  this  view  thick  epistemic 
concepts have some significant non-epistemic content and thin epistemic concepts 
have no, or not much, such content. 
Neither way of taking the analogy with the case of ethics is clearly good. 
To  see  this,  first  consider  examples  typically  used  to  illustrate  a  distinction 
between thick and thin epistemic concepts. Standard “thin” epistemic concepts 
include  EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION,  RATIONALITY,  and  KNOWLEDGE.  Standard  “thick” 
epistemic concepts come in a somewhat more varied list, including INTELLECTUAL 
CURIOSITY,  GULLIBILITY,  and  the  concepts  expressed  by  certain  occurrences  of 
‘conscientious,’ ‘careless,’ ‘lucky,’ and ‘trustworthy.’ The existence of some sort 
of  distinction  between  these  groups  of  concepts  isn’t  in  doubt.  It  also  seems 
plausible that in the case of epistemology, too, a distinction between the thick and 
the thin marks a continuum rather than a binary distinction. Just as concepts like 
JUSTICE,  IMPARTIALITY,  EQUALITY,  RIGHTS,  AUTONOMY,  and INTERESTS fit  no  more 
obviously with  GOOD or  RIGHT than with  BRUTALITY or  KINDNESS,  so concepts like 
DECEIVING, PROPORTIONED TO EVIDENCE, INDUCTIVE SUPPORT, SIMPLICITY, COHERENCE, INSIGHT, 
and EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY fit no more obviously with JUSTIFICATION or  KNOWLEDGE 
than with INTELLECTUAL CAUTION or GULLIBILITY.
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The direct analogy presupposes that all epistemic terms are evaluative. Its 
whole point is to distinguish thick epistemic concepts from the thin on the basis of 
whether  they  have  some  significant  non-evaluative  content  in  addition  to  
evaluative  content.  But,  even  if  some epistemic  terms  are  evaluative,  it  is  a 
substantive and controversial issue whether  all are. Whether epistemic concepts 
are normative is a central issue in debates over naturalized epistemology sparked 
by W.V.O. Quine (1969). The point can also be raised just with examples. 
One  type  of  example  is  that  calling  someone  ‘quick  to  jump  to 
conclusions’  or  ‘intellectually  biased’  often  conveys  some  kind  of  negative 
evaluation of the person or their belief-formation. But, since words which aren’t 
as  a  matter  of  their  meaning  evaluative  can  still  be  used  to  communicate 
evaluations in contexts with suitable common grounds, this negative evaluative 
content might be merely pragmatically implicated or conveyed. Sometimes such 
negative  evaluation  might  also  not  be  appropriate.  Some  hold  that  it  can  be 
epistemically appropriate for some beliefs to be influenced by certain intellectual 
biases or heuristics when beliefs formed in these ways tend in fact to be reliable.5
Another  type  of  example  is  that  various  concepts  of  reliability  often 
occupy an important role in epistemology, but don’t seem to be evaluative. All 
these concepts concern some or other sort of probabilistic connection to truth, but 
neither TRUTH nor PROBABILITY is, itself, an evaluative or normative concept. What 
makes  it  true  that  smoke  raises  the  probability  of  fire,  for  example,  are  the 
worldly  nomological  connections  between  the  presence  of  the  one  and  the 
presence of the other, not anything normative. 
Thus the direct analogy from ethics to epistemology seems, at present, too 
quick. To further assess this charge, we can consider two ways to resist it. One 
move is to claim that while these concepts seem epistemic but non-evaluative, 
they  in  fact  are  evaluative.  For  instance,  suppose  that  jumping  quickly  to 
5. See e.g. Gigerenzer et al. (2000). Bishop and Trout (2005) argue that epistemic excellence 
doesn’t ban ignoring factors that seem evidentially relevant; using simple statistical prediction 
rules based on a limited number of cues is at least no less efficient and reliable. On epistemic 
shortcuts generally, see Bach (1984). 
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conclusions is sometimes but not always epistemically bad. This shows that QUICK 
TO JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS isn’t  an  evaluative  concept  only if  evaluative  concepts 
cannot license different kinds of evaluation in different contexts, such as positive 
in  some  but  neutral  or  even  negative  in  others.  Many  discussions  of  thick 
concepts in ethics challenge just this assumption.6 But its truth is clearly not to be 
settled by fiat. Nor would its truth alone establish that concepts like QUICK TO JUMP 
TO CONCLUSIONS really are evaluative concepts after all. So this first move on behalf 
of the direct analogy would go only so far.
Another move is to claim that concepts which seem epistemic but non-
evaluative in fact  aren’t  epistemic.  Just as concepts like  PLEASURE and  PAIN,  for 
instance, needn’t be evaluative concepts to figure in moral discourse and play a 
role in ethical theory, so concepts like RELIABILITY and QUICK TO JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS 
needn’t be epistemic concepts (or evaluative concepts, for that matter) to figure in 
epistemic discourse or play a role in epistemology. If they were non-epistemic 
concepts, then they would obviously cut no ice against the direct analogy. 
This second move on behalf of the direct analogy is viable only to the 
extent  that  there  is  a  good  distinction  between  epistemic  and  non-epistemic 
concepts. Obviously, the same is true of the structural analogy. The existence of 
some  sort  of  distinction  isn’t  in  doubt,  since  there  are  clear  cases  of  both 
epistemic  and  non-epistemic  concepts.  But  notice  that  the  present  dialectical 
context requires a distinction which is also neutral on the issue whether there is a 
good distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts. That is precisely the 
issue at stake. It wouldn’t do to say, for instance, that epistemic concepts are those 
which have some significant conceptual connection to knowledge or epistemic 
justification, since KNOWLEDGE and EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION are among the paradigm 
examples of thin epistemic concepts. A dialectically kosher distinction between 
epistemic and non-epistemic concepts requires a basis that falls on neither side of 
the intuitive distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts.
6.  This assumption is challenged by theorists as different as Blackburn (1992) and Dancy 
(1995). It is a crucial implicit premise in the argument that thick virtue concepts aren’t in fact 
evaluative concepts in Brower (1988). 
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But now it has become difficult to see on what basis the requisite kind of 
distinction  could  be  drawn.  Numerous  unclear  cases  reinforce  the  worry.  For 
instance,  are  ‘intellectually  cautious,’  ‘trusting,’  ‘discerning,’  or  ‘hasty,’  as  a 
matter  of their meaning, epistemic terms? The answer is unclear.  These terms 
seem  to  have  no  clear  connections  to  concepts  which  would  both  suggest 
classifying them as epistemic and be dialectically admissible. Yet they don’t seem 
clearly non-epistemic either. They can be used to describe things like judgments, 
inferences, and habits of belief-formation, which all fall under the subject matter 
of epistemology. 
The structural analogy is thrown into doubt if there is no good basis for 
distinguishing  between  epistemic  and  non-epistemic  concepts  which  falls  on 
neither side of the intuitive distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts. 
The only serious candidate that I can think of, TRUTH, is dialectically inadmissible: 
it  would  sit  ill  with  those  advocates  of  thicker  epistemology  who  think  that 
contemporary epistemology is excessively focused on truth.7 
Nor is the direct analogy rescued from doubt. One procedure for settling 
unclear cases is to classify a term as epistemic if we are uncertain whether it is 
epistemic.8 The  procedure  would  count  such  a  varied  a  range  of  concepts  as 
epistemic that it would be implausible that a wide range of concepts which seem 
epistemic but non-evaluative in fact are evaluative concepts or that they in fact 
aren’t  epistemic  concepts.9 This  result  would  render  implausible  precisely  the 
claims made by our first  and second defensive  moves on behalf  of  the direct 
analogy. 
I  conclude  that  it  is  far  from clear  that  there  is  a  good,  clear  way to 
distinguish between thick and thin epistemic concepts on the basis of an analogy 
with  ethics.  The  foregoing  also  gives  some  evidence  that  if  a  good,  clear 
7. See e.g. Elgin (2008). See also §4 below. I’m assuming that TRUTH isn’t an epistemic 
concept.
8. For an analogous procedure for classifying terms into evaluative and descriptive, see 
Jackson (1998: 120). 
9. My point here is dialectical. I don’t, mean to rule out the possibility that some terms which 
might seem epistemic (or of whose classification we are uncertain) in fact aren’t, as a matter 
of meaning, epistemic terms. 
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distinction is found, it won’t be straightforward. In what follows, I won’t try to 
say more about what would be the best way to understand a distinction between 
thick and thin epistemic concepts. More clearly remains to be said on the issue. 
3. How not to strike it thick: the semantics of epistemic terms 
Suppose that a good way to draw a distinction between thick and thin epistemic 
concepts were eventually found, whether by analogy with ethics or not. (Again, 
the existence of some sort of distinction isn’t in doubt.) It would still be a further 
claim that this distinction makes some important difference in epistemology. I’ll 
now argue that its importance cannot be established on semantic grounds: there is 
no  systematic  semantic  difference  between  thick  and  thin  epistemic  concepts 
which as such makes the distinction important to epistemology. My case is that 
the basic semantic treatment which is appropriate to (most) epistemic terms treats 
terms  expressing  thick  concepts  and  terms  expressing  thin  concepts 
fundamentally in the same way. 
The semantic  treatment  I  have  in  mind  is  the  standard  sort  of  formal 
semantics  for  gradable  adjectives,  such  as  ‘tall,’  ‘young,’  and  ‘expensive.’ 
Gradable adjectives are well studied in linguistics. Thus, if what we know about 
their  semantics  is  applicable  to  epistemic  terms,  then  this  will  provide  some 
independent basis for assessing whether the importance of a distinction between 
thick and thin epistemic concepts can be given a semantic basis. 
The class of words which express  epistemic concepts is  grammatically 
heterogeneous. It includes adjectives, gerund and participle constructions, nouns, 
and verbs: consider ‘gullible’ and ‘coherent,’ ‘discerning’ and ‘proportioned to 
evidence,’  ‘justification’  and  ‘intellectual  curiosity,’  and  ‘trusts’  and  ‘knows,’ 
respectively. This isn’t a deep problem for my strategy. Most of these words are 
gradable or have a cognate gradable expression. So most epistemic concepts have 
linguistic  expressions  with  just  the  syntactic  features  which  are  sufficient  for 
gradability.  First,  they admit  of comparatives: Things can be  more rational  or 
better proportioned to evidence than others, or less gullible or less epistemically 
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responsible  than others.  Second,  they  take  on  degree  modifiers  like  ‘very’  or 
‘somewhat’:  Things  can  be  quite quick  to  jump  to  conclusions,  somewhat 
intellectually curious,  totally reliable, or very well justified.10 So, what we know 
about gradable expressions seems applicable to a wide range of epistemic terms.
What comparatives do semantically is to establish an ordering between 
two things regarding some common feature that can be enjoyed to a greater or 
lesser extent. The standard semantics for gradable adjectives takes them to locate 
objects  on  a  scale (such  as  tallness  in  the  case  of  ‘tall’),  defined  as  a  set  of 
degrees (or intervals) ordered with respect to some property dimension (such as 
height in the case of ‘tall’).11 So the basic semantic value of a gradable adjective is 
a function from objects to values (degrees or intervals) on a scale.12
The interpretation of the comparative form is simple. (1a) is analyzed as 
(1b-c):
1. a. Stan is taller than Buster.
b. The value Stan takes on a scale of tallness is greater than the value 
Buster takes on a scale of tallness.
c. tall(Stan) > tall(Buster)13
An adequate treatment of gradable adjectives must explain how comparatives are 
semantically related to their non-comparative positive correlates and capture the 
context-sensitivity which the latter exhibit in many cases. For instance, someone 
10. Most epistemic terms also exhibit a further syntactic feature of gradable expressions: they 
tend to take on certain other modifier phrases, such as ‘for’ and ‘to’ prepositional phrases and 
‘enough to’ adverbial phrases. Consider ‘reliable for a heuristic,’ ‘too gullible to be a 
detective,’ ‘incoherent enough to be delusional,’ etc.
11. Kennedy (2007) requires that the ordering be a total ordering. But many gradable 
adjectives seem more plausibly linked to partial orderings rather than total orderings. In at 
least some cases the “scale” isn’t linear. 
12. See especially Kennedy (2007) and Glanzberg (2007). For earlier work developing this 
approach, see Cresswell (1977), Klein (1980), and von Stechow (1984). On the use of 
intervals instead of degrees, see Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002). Degrees (and intervals) 
are here understood as abstract representations of measurement. 
13. I’ll use boldface, like tall, to designate semantic values, interpreted in this case as degrees 
on a scale. 
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can  count  as  tall  relative  to  a  context  where  silent  film comedians  are  under 
discussion but not tall when basketball players are. 
According  to  the scalar  analysis,  ‘tall’ can express  different  properties 
relative  to  different  contexts  of  utterance  because  ‘tall’ allows  context  to 
determine some particular degree value  d as the minimal point which an object 
must take on the scale of tallness – the scale along which ‘is taller than’ compares 
objects – to count as satisfying the predicate. So here is the positive form:
2. a. Stan is tall. 
b. The value Stan takes on a scale of tallness is greater than (or, at 
least as great as) the minimal value d required for counting as 
satisfying ‘tall’ in context c. 
c. tall(Stan) > d 
The value of d (determined for the adjective by context) is the standard for that 
adjective and context.  To count as satisfying ‘tall’  is  to  meet  the contextually 
determined  standard  for  tallness.  Degree  modifiers  can  then  be  understood as 
modifying the required degree value on the relevant scale. For instance, ‘very tall’ 
can be taken to increase the required degree of height.
We already saw syntactic evidence for counting most epistemic terms of 
varying  degrees  of  thickness  and  thinness  as  gradable  and  thereby (following 
standard  methodology  in  linguistics)  for  treating  these  terms  as  semantically 
linked to scales in the way outlined above. This latter claim has also some non-
syntactic  evidence  behind  it.  Many  examples  suggest  that  whether  something 
counts as satisfying one of these terms depends on whether it takes a value on 
some scale  which  is  greater  than  the  minimal  value  required  for  counting  as 
satisfying the adjective in the context. One can count as epistemically responsible 
relative to a context where epistemic couch potatoes are under discussion, but not 
count  as  epistemically  responsible  relative  to  scientific  or  legal  contexts,  or 
gullible relative to members of the Skeptical Society but not five-year-olds. And 
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epistemological  contextualists  argue  at  length  that  a  belief  can  count  as 
epistemically justified (or as knowledge) relative to a “low-stakes” context, but 
not count as justified (or as knowledge) relative to a “high-stakes” context.14 
One might object that this semantics fails to generalize properly because 
some  epistemic  concepts  have  no  gradable  expression.  For  instance,  ‘know’ 
clearly doesn’t behave syntactically like a gradable expression.15 This seems to be 
no mere syntactic fluke. Certain expressions which are syntactically similar  to 
‘know’ behave like gradable expressions; consider ‘believe,’ ‘regret,’ or ‘trust.’ 
But this objection has at most limited force.16 Even if not all epistemic concepts 
have  gradable  expressions,  and  even  if  this  turns  out  be  epistemologically 
important,  it  still  fails  to  track a  distinction between thick and thin  epistemic 
concepts. Many typical examples of thin epistemic terms, such as ‘epistemically 
justified’ and ‘rational,’ are gradable. 
This  semantics  for  epistemic  terms  doesn’t  support  the  claim  that  a 
distinction  between  thick  and  thin  epistemic  concepts  makes  an  important 
difference  to  epistemology.  Terms  that  express  thick  epistemic  concepts  get 
fundamentally the same semantic treatment as terms that express thin ones: both 
are analyzed along the lines of (1)-(2). Just as ‘Maria is intellectually curious’ is 
true just in case the value Maria takes on a scale of intellectual curiosity is greater 
than the minimal value required for counting as satisfying ‘intellectually curious’ 
14. See e.g. Cohen (1999) and DeRose (1999). Note that if the standards for counting as 
satisfying some term vary with context, it doesn’t directly follow that a contextualist 
semantics is correct for the term in question. 
15. For an early case, see Dretske (1981: Ch. 5). For a more recent and complete case, see 
Stanley (2004, 2005).
16. The objection may in fact have no force at all. Since it takes the fact that certain epistemic 
terms don’t behave like gradable expressions to show that the appropriate semantics for these 
terms isn’t scalar, it presupposes that an expression e is semantically linked to a scale s only if 
e is gradable along s. But the scalar analysis requires only that epistemic terms have semantic 
links to scales, not that they behave syntactically like gradable expressions. For instance, even 
if ‘know’ isn’t gradable, it may still be semantically linked to a scale of epistemic strength 
along which knowledge states can be ordered and bear some other syntactic marks of semantic 
links to scales, such as adverbial modifiability (see e.g. Blome-Tillman 2008: 43-47). 
Extending the scalar analysis to ‘know’ would require no more. Whether all non-gradable 
epistemic terms in fact bear syntactic marks of semantic links to scales is, of course, an 
empirical question. But at least all of the epistemic terms that are mentioned above are either 
gradable or adverbially modifiable. 
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in context, so ‘Jim's belief that p is epistemically justified’ is true just in case the 
value Jim’s belief takes on a scale of epistemic justification is greater than the 
minimal  value  required  for  counting  as  satisfying  ‘epistemically  justified’  in 
context.  Moreover,  this semantics doesn’t determine  which  property something 
enjoys to  a  certain extent when it  counts as  satisfying a given term, but only 
requires that there be a property dimension, along which objects can be ordered, 
to be associated with the term in context.17 In this respect of their semantics, terms 
which  express  epistemic  concepts  are  treated  the  same.  If  terms  that  express 
epistemic concepts get the same basic semantic treatment regardless of how thick 
or  thin  they  are,  then  the  importance  of  a  distinction  between  thick  and  thin 
epistemic concepts cannot be established via semantics. 
For all this, epistemic terms might still differ semantically in some respect 
other  than  their  formal  semantics.  For  instance,  their  semantic  interpretation 
requires fixing a scale and the values of contextual parameters like the standard. 
These are set by a computation based on a wide range of inputs from context.18 
So, thick and thin epistemic terms might still exhibit some systematic differences 
– differences that might have importance to epistemology – with respect to factors 
which determine the semantic interpretation of the occurrences of these terms.19
To cut a long story short, among the relevant factors only the conventional 
meanings of epistemic terms can hope to exhibit systematic semantic differences 
17. Often the property dimension won’t be as fully determined by the conventional meaning 
of the word as with ‘tall’ (height), ‘young’ (age), and ‘cheap’ (cost). Semanticists skirt the 
issue of what the relevant dimension is.
18. What contextual factors qualify as inputs, what computational rules must be taken into 
account, and how these must be weighed in semantic interpretation are complex issues 
grouped together as “metasemantics.” For a brief overview of the small amount of systematic 
work done to date on metasemantics, see Glanzberg (2007). 
19. Differences in what the occurrences of one and the same epistemic term express in 
different contexts won’t suffice to make this case. For instance, if the contextualist thesis that 
‘know’ is context-sensitive is true, then in principle any factor of the relevant kind can 
generate important differences in what relation is expressed by different utterances of ‘know’; 
and similarly for contextualism about any other epistemic term. But this is a point about 
different tokens of one and the same epistemic term. It wouldn’t support the claim that there 
are systematic epistemologically important differences between those contextual factors which 
determine the interpretation of pairs of different epistemic terms, such as ‘intellectually 
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between them.20 (It  is  plausible that  to  compute  what  a  sentence expresses in 
context one should make as much use as possible of the conventional meanings of 
expressions.21)  Terms  like  ‘intellectually  curious’  and  ‘epistemically  justified’ 
seem thick to different degrees. And this seems to reflect precisely a difference in 
their conventional meanings,  namely in the amount of information which they 
encode concerning the property dimensions of their associated scales.  If I  call 
someone intellectually  curious,  then  competent  speakers  will  take me to  have 
made certain fairly specific claims about the cast of her intellectual character. But 
if I say that some belief is epistemically justified, then competent speakers can 
only take me to have made a certain relatively generic claim about the degree of 
epistemic strength enjoyed by the belief, unless they or the context supply some 
further, more specific substantive ideas about what epistemic strength is. 
But why think that this sort of difference in the conventional meanings of 
terms like ‘intellectually curious’ and ‘justified’ establishes  the importance of a 
distinction  between  thick  and  thin  epistemic  concepts  to  epistemology?  It  is 
highly  contingent  that  words  have  the  conventional  meanings  they  do.  Why 
should  the  factors  on  which  conventional  meaning  is  contingent,  or  even  the 
particular factors which have made certain epistemic terms thicker than others, be 
factors which generate or even track epistemologically important distinctions? 
No doubt  there  is  no easy answer  here.  But  consider  this.  Saying that 
someone’s  way  of  forming  beliefs  is  conscientious  or  careless,  for  instance, 
doesn’t impart very specific information about how they form their beliefs. They 
might be conscientious in collecting evidence but careless in checking that the 
curious’ and ‘epistemically justified.’
20. Among other potentially relevant factors, (a) computational rules tend to be insufficiently 
word specific, (b) discourse structure is highly contingent and may be determined by non-
epistemic or epistemically objectionable factors, and (c) the intentions, interests, and other 
salient properties of speakers and hearers or context which have parameter-setting force can 
seemingly differ systematically between different epistemic terms only if the roles of these 
terms in epistemic discourse already differ in ways one would expect their conventional 
meanings to reflect. This list of factors borrows from Kennedy (2007) and Glanzberg (2007). I 
don’t claim that it is comprehensive.
21. Kennedy (2007: 36) calls this rule the “principle of interpretive economy” and defends it 
at length.  
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samples are representative, or vice versa. These claims are similarly indeterminate 
with respect to many other aspects of belief formation. But, for all that has been 
shown  so  far,  these  features  of  carelessness  or  conscientiousness  might  be 
epistemologically  important  only  insofar  as  they  bear  on  such  more  general 
factors as the quality of one’s evidence, the reliability of one’s beliefs, or the like. 
Thus  differences  in  the  conventional  meanings  of  epistemic  terms  of  varying 
degrees  of thickness,  such as  the sort  of more specific  information which the 
conventional  meanings  of  terms  like  ‘conscientious’  and  ‘careless’  encode  in 
comparison to terms like ‘justified,’ don’t seem sufficiently deep and systematic 
to  establish  that  a  distinction  between thick and  thin  epistemic  terms as  such 
makes an important difference to epistemology. This suggests that the importance 
of this distinction must be established on some other than semantic grounds. 
4. The thick and the thin in substantive epistemology
The moral of my story so far is that, assuming the possibility of making some 
good distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts, one can establish that 
it  makes  a  significant  difference  to  epistemology  only  through  substantive 
epistemology. My aim in this final section is to argue that the case is yet to be 
made for anything that could truthfully be advertised as a radical turn to a thicker 
epistemology. My strategy is to argue that there is no good reason to think that 
thick epistemic concepts enjoy any systematic theoretical priority over the thin. 
Since  the  issue  concerns  whether  epistemology  has  a  certain  general  and 
systematic kind of theoretical shape, establishing my conclusion requires only that 
some  wide  enough  range  of  thick  epistemic  concepts  play  no  privileged 
theoretical role. If some individual thick concepts play important roles fully in 
their own right, this doesn’t yet establish any systematic priority or establish that 
a distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts as such is important. 
One way to defend my claim is to argue that thick and thin epistemic 
concepts  are  mostly  similar  in  respects  which  could  systematically  make  a 
substantive difference to epistemology. One such respect is that many concepts 
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which play a role in epistemological theory do so only because they either are 
partly defined or explicated in  terms of truth or else bear some other kind of 
important connection to truth.22 KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION, and RELIABILITY are often 
taken  to  satisfy  the  former  condition.  GULLIBILITY and  REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE, 
among others, are often taken to satisfy the latter. For instance, even many true 
beliefs  of  gullible  people  are  connected  to  truth  in  a  way  that  many 
epistemologists regard as defective. Gullible people tend to form beliefs on the 
basis of factors that have no stable connection to truth. Even many of their true 
beliefs tend not to be beliefs one would have only if they were true; even if they 
are in fact true, they could all too easily have been false.23 This kind of connection 
to truth seems to be too unstable to make the true beliefs in question count as 
knowledge. A similar indirect connection to truth underpins the theoretical role of 
many other concepts in epistemology. So, it seems legitimate to defend or dispute 
assigning or withholding some concept a theoretical role in epistemology on the 
basis of whether it bears some important connection to truth.24
Many  debates  in  epistemology  are  further  evidence  for  this  claim. 
Coherence theories of epistemic justification are often criticized on the grounds 
that coherence isn’t truth indicative: a set of beliefs could be highly coherent even 
if most of them were false or their coherence and truth were only accidentally 
connected. Basically the same objection is sometimes raised against internalist 
22. I mean ‘only because’ to state a necessary constitutive condition which may not be 
sufficient. 
23. That is, a gullible person's beliefs tend to fail the “safety” condition on knowledge 
advocated in Sosa (1999). Even Elgin (2008), in a discussion otherwise aimed against a 
supposed hegemony of truth in epistemology, argues that TRUSTWORTHINESS bears just this kind 
of indirect but important counterfactual connections to truth. 
24. I have not said or implied that the epistemic status of a belief is some direct function of its 
truth or that having true beliefs is the most important epistemic challenge or aim, let alone the 
only fundamental one. I can happily allow that not all epistemic challenges concern truth or 
even knowledge. Even in relation to truth, the challenges of avoiding false beliefs, avoiding 
beliefs that could all too easily have been false, and so on, are distinct from, but no less 
important than, the challenge of having true beliefs, but may require different strategies. And 
clearly the full epistemic status of a belief is only an indirect and partial function of its truth. I 
also haven't said that the relevant connection to truth is promoting true belief (so that, e.g., the 
importance of avoiding being gullible is that this promotes true belief). I only require some 
important connection to truth. 
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theories of knowledge or epistemic justification: the fact that a belief has a certain 
internalistic feature is only accidentally connected to truth and so isn’t a good 
indicator of truth. Also note that opponents of coherentism (or internalism) often 
agree that the lack of coherence (or the relevant internalistic feature) can weaken 
or defeat epistemic justification, precisely when beliefs which lack the feature in 
question are to  that  extent  less  likely to be true.  Many other debates seem to 
replicate basically the same structure.
It seems clear that if a particular concept bears some important connection 
to truth, it does so independently of whether it is thick or thin. So there is no 
difference in this respect between thick and thin epistemic concepts which could 
make  a  substantive  epistemological  difference.25 The  range  of  thick  concepts 
which bear an important connection to truth also seems wide enough to rule out 
any systematic theoretical priority of thick concepts over the thin. The natural 
objection  is  that  these  concepts  might  yet  differ  systematically  in  some other 
respect that  is important to epistemology. I can offer two points to preempt this 
objection. 
Firstly, thick epistemic concepts which make a difference to epistemology 
independently of their connections to truth or such paradigmatically thin notions 
as  knowledge  seem too  few to  establish  that  thick  concepts  enjoy  systematic 
theoretical priority over the thin. Many theories of knowledge incorporate various 
other epistemic notions that are often cited as thick in the literature. Some hold 
that the concept of knowledge is used to flag trustworthy informants (Craig 1991). 
Others hold that it is  reasonable or  appropriate to rely on a proposition  p  as a 
premise  in  practical  reasoning  and  act  on  its  basis  only  if  one  knows  that  p 
(Hawthorne 2004, Stanley 2005). Many hold that a belief which might easily have 
been false doesn’t count as knowledge, so that knowledge requires basing one’s 
beliefs  on  stable and  safe reasons.  But  if  one’s  beliefs  regarding  some 
25. Although many thin epistemic concepts seem to be partly defined in terms of truth 
whereas most thick ones have only some less direct connection to truth, this difference seems 
insufficiently systematic or categorical to show that the distinction as such makes a 
substantive and significant difference to epistemology.
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phenomenon  are  of  this  kind,  then  typically  one  appreciates  explanatory 
connections regarding it in a way that at least partly constitutes understanding. I 
see nothing in these connections to suggest that the thick epistemic notions in 
question would be theoretically prior to knowledge. What they do suggest is that 
many  contemporary  epistemologists  already  do  incorporate  various  thick 
epistemic notions in their theories.
Secondly, the claim that thick epistemic concepts don’t enjoy systematic 
priority over the thin fits the structure of epistemological theories better than the 
claim that they do. For instance, many theories of knowledge attempt to analyze 
knowledge in terms of belief,  truth, plus further, epistemic conditions, such as 
justification  or warrant  (and,  often,  some “fourth  condition”  to  handle  Gettier 
cases).  No  such  theory  will  tell  us  which  beliefs  count  as  knowledge  until 
supplemented  with  a  further  substantive  theory  of  the  conditions  in  virtue  of 
which a belief is epistemically justified or warranted when it is. Issues at stake 
include:  whether or not  these conditions comprise only factors  which indicate 
truth and also are “internal” in some sense; what the more specific such factors 
are, such as whether the belief is proportioned to evidence, or coheres with one's 
other beliefs, or was formed responsibly or reliably, or what have you; and so on. 
Many of these issues at stake between these substantive theories are formulated in 
terms that are thicker than notions of justification, warrant, or knowledge.26 But 
nothing in  this  theoretical  structure  shows that  thick epistemic concepts  enjoy 
systematic theoretical priority over the thin. 
A comparison with the case of ethics may, in this case, prove illuminating. 
Theories  of  moral  rightness  attempt to  specify  the  conditions  under  which an 
action is morally right: maximizing the good, treating no one as a mere means, 
violating no stringent rights, being what a virtuous person would do, and whatnot. 
These different substantive theories are structurally on a par, in that none of them 
will tell us which actions are morally right until supplemented with a substantive 
26. It would, however, be worth exploring when accounting for a thin epistemic notion in 
terms of a thicker one succeeds because of the latter's thickness.
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account of their central notion: what the good is, what it is to treat someone as a 
mere means, what it is to violate a stringent right, what a virtuous person is, or 
whatnot.27 Such  accounts  are  typically  formulated  in  terms  of  thicker  ethical 
notions. 
But a thick ethical concept seems to play this theoretical role only when 
its role can be characterized partly in thinner terms, in a way that locates and 
structures the relevance of the thick concept in the ethical domain.28 For instance, 
even if  WELL-BEING is a thick value concept, it plays an important role in ethical 
theory not only insofar as considerations of well-being are legitimately invoked in 
ethical assessment, have some connection to motivation, and so on, but also only 
insofar as they are relevant to what is right or good. Otherwise WELL-BEING would 
seem to belong together with CHIVALRY and CHASTITY in the theoretical scrap heap. 
In the epistemic case, a similar line seems plausible. Thicker concepts like 
INTELLECTUAL CAUTION and GULLIBILITY seem to play an important theoretical role in 
epistemology  only  insofar  as  they  are  legitimately  invoked  in  epistemic 
assessment  and  have  some connection,  however  indirect,  to  considerations  of 
rationality,  justification, or knowledge. Circumstances in which no such actual 
connection  exists  are  easy to  imagine.  If,  for  instance,  we inhabited  a  highly 
uniform  world,  then  whether  one  were  intellectually  cautious  or  drew  hasty 
generalizations wouldn't affect the actual reliability of one's beliefs. Neither one's 
way of selecting the samples from which one generalizes nor their size would 
have such an effect. Similarly, if we inhabited a world of compulsive truth tellers, 
gullibility would have no effect on the actual reliability of our beliefs. Given just 
the actual facts  about these worlds, intellectual caution and gullibility have no 
effect on the epistemic status of one's beliefs. They can count as epistemic defects 
in  these  sorts  of  worlds  only  insofar  as  epistemic  assessment  doesn't  depend 
solely on facts about the actual world but has also some counterfactual dimension. 
27. For this point about the structure of moral theories, see especially Hursthouse (1996). 
28. This should seem especially reasonable if there is anything to the idea that value concepts 
get their content at least partly from the role they play in (some idealized version of) ethical 
thought. See Jackson (1998: Ch. 4).
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But  note  that  the  relevant  counterfactual  dimension,  and  thus  the 
epistemic defect involved in gullibility or lack of caution, is usually analyzed at 
least in part in thin epistemic terms. Some theorists say that these beliefs aren't 
robustly reliable because they would no longer have been reliable had the world 
been  different  even  in  fairly  minor  ways;  others,  that  they  fail  to  count  as 
knowledge  because  they  were  formed  without  ruling  out  certain  relevant 
alternatives which were epistemically possible to the agent; and so on.29 If the 
theoretical  role  of  many  thick  epistemic  concepts  in  epistemology  is  best 
characterized partly  in  thin terms,  then we have no reason to  think that  thick 
epistemic  concepts  enjoy  any  systematic  theoretical  priority  over  the  thin.  (It 
doesn't follow that thin concepts enjoy any systematic theoretical priority over the 
thick. It  could be that there is no general priority either way. This would still 
allow for local priorities between individual notions in either direction.) 
I conclude that if a distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts 
as such makes a significant difference to epistemology, this isn't because thick 
concepts enjoy some systematic theoretical priority over the thin. The cumulative 
force  of the  challenges  I  have sought  to  raise  for  this  hypothesis  is  that  it  is 
difficult to see on what other substantive epistemological grounds the distinction 
as such could plausibly be held to have importance to epistemology, beyond the 
possibility  (which  I  can  happily  allow)  that  some  individual  thick  epistemic 
notions  turn  out  to  have  been  insufficiently  appreciated  in  substantive 
epistemological theory.30 Of course,  for  all  I  have said,  such grounds may yet 
exist. But finding them remains a challenge to the advocates of a greater focus on 
29. As in the ethical case, these characterizations locate and structure the relevance of a thick 
notion in the epistemic domain. For instance, they can be helpful in articulating and 
explaining sources of defeat: reasons why something may fail to possess the kind of general 
positive epistemic status which is expressed by such thin epistemic concepts as RELIABILITY or 
JUSTIFICATION. 
30. Note that everything that I have said allows that thick epistemic concepts raise 
theoretically important issues in substantive epistemology. For instance, the issue whether 
thick epistemic concepts can be  informatively decomposed into thin epistemic and purely 
non-epistemic components need be no less relevant to the prospects for virtue epistemology or 
expressivist treatments of epistemic discourse, and can be given their full due, even if a 
distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts as such makes no significant difference 
to epistemology.
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thick epistemic concepts. The case has yet to be made for anything that could 
truthfully be advertised as a radical turn to thicker epistemology.31 
5. Conclusion
The general position defended in this paper could perhaps be thought of as slim 
epistemology with a thick skin or exterior. But I suspect that many contemporary 
epistemological theories may already be thick enough that it would be unsound to 
charge them with neglecting thick epistemic concepts in favor of the thin in some 
way that is distorting or too narrow.32 In conclusion, I wish briefly to address this 
charge against contemporary epistemology. 
We  saw  earlier  that  the  distinction  between  thick  and  thin  epistemic 
concepts  is  a  matter  of  degree  rather  than  binary  and  that  many  epistemic 
concepts seem to fall somewhere between such typical examples of thick and thin 
epistemic concepts as GULLIBILITY and INTELLECTUAL CURIOSITY, and JUSTIFICATION and 
KNOWLEDGE, respectively. Consider, just as a sample selection, BASING, PROPORTIONED 
TO EVIDENCE,  SELF-EVIDENCE,  INDUCTIVE SUPPORT,  SAFETY,  RELIABILITY,  COHERENCE, 
EPISTEMIC LUCK, and EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY. Are these concepts thick or thin? 
If these concepts are thick, then contemporary epistemology is far more 
concerned  with  thick  epistemic  concepts  than  the  wholesale  charge  against 
contemporary  epistemology allows.  After  all,  many contemporary theories  are 
built around concepts on this list. 
But if these concepts are thin, then the class of thin epistemic concepts is 
far more rich and diverse than the typical examples of such concepts suggest and 
it is far from clear that focusing on thin concepts distorts or oversimplifies. After 
all, the concepts on this list are familiar currency in ordinary epistemic discourse. 
31. I applaud Elgin (2008) for recognizing that such a case must be made within substantive 
epistemology. Still, I think her paper fails to expose any deep gap in mainstream 
epistemology. My case for this is largely implicit in my discussion in this section. But this 
isn't the occasion to present an explicit account of those reasons. 
32. Williams (1985) is the locus classicus of this charge in the case of contemporary ethical 
theories. My argument against the parallel charge I describe in the text against contemporary 
epistemological theories is parallel to the argument against Williams's charge concerning 
ethics in Scheffler (1987: 417). 
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And if some of the concepts on the list are thick while the others are thin, that 
gives some support to each horn of this dilemma for the charge that contemporary 
epistemology neglects thick epistemic concepts over the thin 
It  is  a  complicated  issue  whether  the  list  of  concepts  which  could  be 
compiled to show that contemporary epistemology is more rich and diverse than 
some people claim would supply  enough richness and diversity. That depends, 
among other things, on what substantive connections obtain between the notions 
which figure on the list and the notions which don't. It would be premature to 
make any general pronouncement on these issues here. 
But  even  if  such  a  list  of  concepts  still  lacked  enough  richness  and 
diversity,  this would only establish the piecemeal  result  that certain individual 
thick epistemic concepts have greater theoretical importance than has previously 
been appreciated.  It  wouldn't  show that  the distinction between thick and thin 
epistemic concepts as such has the sort  of theoretical  importance which could 
truthfully be advertised as supporting a radical turn to thicker epistemology. Thus, 
far  from  checking  myself  in  for  rehab  with  Anorexic  Epistemologists 
Anonymous,  I  remain  yet  to  be  convinced  that  systematically  favoring  thick 
epistemic concepts over the thin would be a desirable change in epistemology.33 
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